

(Reprint No. 1)

SOUTH AUSTRALIA

WRONGS ACT, 1936

This Act is reprinted pursuant to the Acts Republication Act, 1967, and incorporates all amendments in force as at 15 January 1992.

It should be noted that the Act was not revised (for obsolete references, etc.) by the Commissioner of Statute Revision prior to the publication of this reprint.

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WRONGS ACT, 1936

being

Wrongs Act, 1936, No. 2267 of 1936 [Assented to 13 August 1936]

as amended by

Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1939, No. 18 of 1939 [Assented to 22 November 1939]
Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1940, No. 48 of 1940 [Assented to 28 November 1940]
Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1944, No. 14 of 1944 [Assented to 23 November 1944]
Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1951, No. 50 of 1951 [Assented to 13 December 1951]
Statute Law Revision Act, 1952, No. 42 of 1952 [Assented to 4 December 1952]
Limitation of Actions and Wrongs Acts Amendment Act, 1956, No. 17 of 1956 [Assented to 8 November 1956]
Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1956, No. 49 of 1956 [Assented to 22 November 1956]
Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1958, No. 58 of 1958 [Assented to 27 November 1958]
Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1959, No. 38 of 1959 [Assented to 10 December 1959]
Statutes Amendment (Law of Property and Wrongs) Act, 1972, No. 19 of 1972 [Assented to 30 March 1972]¹
Statutes Amendment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1972, No. 58 of 1972 [Assented to 27 April 1972]¹
Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1974, No. 70 of 1974 [Assented to 17 October 1974]²
Statute Law Revision Act (No. 2), 1975, No. 118 of 1975 [Assented to 4 December 1975]
Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1975, No. 119 of 1975 [Assented to 4 December 1975]³
Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1983, No. 87 of 1983 [Assented to 1 December 1983]
Wrongs Act Amendment Act (No. 2), 1983, No. 116 of 1983 [Assented to 22 December 1983]
Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1986, No. 126 of 1986 [Assented to 24 December 1986]⁴
Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1987, No. 45 of 1987 [Assented to 30 April 1987]⁵
Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1988, No. 41 of 1988 [Assented to 5 May 1988]⁶
Wrongs Amendment Act 1991 No. 38 of 1991 [Assented to 31 October 1991]

Note: Asterisks indicate repeal or deletion of text. For further explanation see Appendix.

An Act to consolidate certain Acts relating to wrongs.

BE IT ENACTED by the Governor of the State of South Australia, with the advice and consent of the Parliament thereof, as follows:

Short title

1. This Act may be cited as the *Wrongs Act, 1936*.

Repeal

2. The following enactments are repealed, namely:—

U.K. 6 and 7 Vict., c. 96 (adopted in South Australia by 17, 1846)—An Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, entitled “An Act to amend the Law respecting defamatory words and libel”. (Sections 1, 2, 9, and 10.)

¹Came into operation 18 May 1972: *Gaz.* 18 May 1972, p. 1926.

²Came into operation 28 November 1974: *Gaz.* 28 November 1974, p. 3373.

³Came into operation 29 January 1976: *Gaz.* 29 January 1976, p. 356.

⁴Came into operation 8 February 1987: *Gaz.* 5 February 1987, p. 250.

⁵Came into operation 5 July 1987: *Gaz.* 28 May 1987, p. 1384.

⁶Came into operation 8 February 1987: s. 2.

No. 1 of 1865-6—An Act for compensating the Families of Persons killed by Accident. (The whole.)

No. 7 of 1865—An Act to amend the Law of Slander. (The whole.)

No. 17 of 1874—An Act to provide for the recovery of damages caused by negligence on the part of persons employed by the Government of South Australia in certain cases. (Section 3.)

No. 646 of 1895—The Law of Libel Amendment Act, 1895. (The whole.)

Act to bind the Crown

3. This Act binds the Crown.

Interpretation

3a. In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears—

“brother” includes half-brother and step-brother:

“child” includes son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, step-son and step-daughter:

“the judgment first given” means—

(a) where a judgment is set aside on appeal, a subsequent judgment that is not set aside;

and

(b) where a judgment is varied on appeal, the judgment as varied:

“newspaper” means any newspaper or journal printed for sale and published in the State periodically at intervals not exceeding thirty-one days:

“parent” includes father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, step-father and step-mother:

“putative spouse” in relation to any cause of action arising under this Act means a person adjudged under the *Family Relationships Act, 1975*, to have been a putative spouse on the day on which the cause of action arose:

“sister” includes half-sister and step-sister:

“spouse” in relation to any cause of action arising under this Act means a person—

(a) who was a lawful spouse on the day on which the cause of action arose;

or

(b) who is adjudged to have been a putative spouse on the day on which the cause of action arose,

and “husband” and “wife” are to be construed accordingly.

Arrangement of Act

3b. The remainder of this Act is arranged as follows:

PART I—DEFAMATION

PART IA—LIABILITY FOR ANIMALS

PART II—WRONGFUL ACTS OR NEGLIGENCE CAUSING DEATH

PART III—GENERAL PROVISIONS.

PART I
DEFAMATION

* * * * *

Words imputing want of chastity to a woman

5. Words spoken and published of any woman imputing to her a want of chastity, shall be and shall be deemed to be slander, and an action shall be sustainable for such words in the same manner and to the same extent as for words charging an indictable offence.

Privilege of newspaper, radio or television reports of legal proceedings

6. A fair and accurate report published by newspaper, radio or television of proceedings publicly heard before any court exercising judicial authority shall, if published contemporaneously with such proceedings, be privileged: Provided that nothing in this section shall authorize the publication of any blasphemous or indecent matter.

Privilege of newspaper, radio or television reports of proceedings of public meetings and of certain bodies and persons

7. (1) A fair and accurate report published by newspaper, radio or television of the proceedings of—

- (a) a public meeting; or
- (ab) either House of Parliament; or
- (b) (except where neither the public nor any reporter is admitted) of any meeting of a municipal or district council, school board of advice, board of health, board or local authority formed or constituted under the provisions of any Act of Parliament, or of any committee appointed by any of the abovementioned bodies; or
- (c) a meeting of any royal commission, select committee of either House of Parliament; or
- (d) a meeting of shareholders in any bank or incorporated company,

and the publication by newspaper, radio or television at the request of any Government office or department, Minister of the Crown, or Commissioner of Police, of any notice or report issued by it or him for the information of the public, shall be privileged unless it is proved that the report or publication was published or made maliciously:

Provided that—

- (a) nothing in this section shall authorize the publication of any blasphemous or indecent matter:
- (b) the protection intended to be afforded by this section shall not be available as a defence in any proceedings if it is proved that the defendant has been requested to publish by the same newspaper or radio or television station, as the case may be, a reasonable letter or statement by way of contradiction or explanation of such report or other publication and has refused or neglected to do so:
- (c) nothing in this section shall be deemed or construed to limit or abridge any privilege now by law existing, or to protect the publication of any matter not of public concern and the publication of which is not for the public benefit.

(2) For the purposes of this section, "public meeting" means any meeting *bona fide* and lawfully held for a lawful purpose, and for the furtherance or discussion of any matter of public concern, whether the admission thereto be general or restricted.

Penalties on unfair and inaccurate reports

8. If any unfair and inaccurate report of any matter mentioned in either of the last two preceding sections is published by newspaper, radio or television, every person responsible for the publication shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, punishable on complaint of any person aggrieved, and on summary conviction, by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three calendar months:

Provided that—

- (a) the punishment shall be by fine only if it is proved that the defendant, as soon as practicable after being informed of the unfairness and inaccuracy of the report, published by the newspaper or radio or television station, as the case may be, a correction thereof, giving to the correction at least equal prominence to that which was given to the original report:
- (b) any person laying a complaint under this section shall be deemed to have waived all other remedies, both civil and criminal, against the same defendant in respect of the same report.

Offer of an apology

9. In any action for defamation, the defendant may, after notice in writing of his intention so to do, duly given to the plaintiff at the time of filing or delivering the defence in the action, give in evidence in mitigation of damages, that he made or offered an apology to the plaintiff for the defamation before the commencement of the action, or if the action was commenced before there was an opportunity of making or offering such an apology, as soon afterwards as he had an opportunity of doing so.

Defence in action against a newspaper or radio or television station for libel

10. (1) In an action for a libel contained in any public newspaper or other periodical publication or in a radio or television broadcast, the defendant may plead that the libel was inserted in the newspaper or other periodical publication or included in the broadcast without actual malice and without gross negligence, and that before the commencement of the action, or at the earliest opportunity afterwards, he inserted in the newspaper or other periodical publication or broadcast on the same radio or television station, a full apology for the libel, or if the newspaper or periodical publication in which the libel appeared was ordinarily published at intervals exceeding one week, offered to publish such an apology in any newspaper or periodical publication to be selected by the plaintiff in the action.

(2) The defendant upon filing such defence may pay into Court a sum of money by way of amends for the injury sustained by the publication of the libel.

(3) To such a defence the plaintiff may reply generally denying the whole of such defence.

Evidence in mitigation of damages

11. At the trial of an action for a libel, the defendant may give in evidence in mitigation of damages that the plaintiff has already recovered or has brought action for damages, or has received or agreed to receive compensation in respect of a libel or libels to the same purport or effect as the libel for which such action has been brought.

Publishing parliamentary reports

12. (1) It shall be lawful for any defendant in any civil or criminal proceeding in respect of the publication of any report, paper, votes, or proceedings of Parliament, which either House of Parliament deems fit and necessary and has authorized to be published, to bring before the Court, after giving twenty-four hours notice to the plaintiff or prosecutor of his intention so to do, a certificate under the hand of the President or Clerk of the Legislative Council, or the Speaker or Clerk of the House of Assembly, stating that the matter in question was published by order or under the authority of the Legislative Council or House of Assembly, as the case may be, together with an affidavit verifying the said certificate, and the court shall thereupon stay the said proceeding, and the same and every writ and process therein shall thereupon be put an end to and superseded, by virtue of this Act.

(2) It shall be lawful for the defendant in any civil or criminal proceeding in respect of the publication of any copy of any such report, paper, votes, or proceedings, to lay before the court, at any stage of the proceeding, the said report, paper, votes, or proceedings, and the said copy together with an affidavit verifying the same and the correctness of the said copy, and the court shall thereupon stay the said proceeding, and the same and every writ and process therein shall thereupon be put an end to and superseded by virtue of this Act.

(3) It shall be a good defence to any civil or criminal proceeding in respect of the printing of any extract from or abstract of such report, paper, votes, or proceedings if the defendant proves that the said extract or abstract was published in good faith and without malice.

(4) The following persons, namely, the Government Printer and those members of the public service who are employed in the making of official reports of the debates and proceedings of Parliament are hereby authorized by each House of Parliament to publish reports of the debates and proceedings of that House:

Provided that this subsection shall not absolve any such person from the duty to conform to any instructions lawfully given to him by any person in authority.

(5) For the purposes of this section the papers which set out the daily business of each House of Parliament and are commonly called "Notices and Orders of the Day" shall be papers of Parliament the publication of which has been authorized by the House concerned.

Consolidation of actions

13. (1) A judge or the court, upon an application by or on behalf of two or more defendants in actions to the same, or substantially the same libel, brought by the same person, may make an order for the consolidation of those actions, so that they shall be tried together.

(2) After such an order has been made, and before the trial of the actions, the defendants in any new actions instituted in respect to the same or substantially the same libel, shall also be entitled to be joined in a common action, upon a joint application being made by those new defendants and the defendants in the actions already consolidated.

Evidence as to publication, matters charged, etc.

14. A court of summary jurisdiction, upon the hearing of a charge against a person responsible for the publication of a libel by newspaper, radio or television, may receive evidence as to the publication being for the public benefit, and as to the matters charged in the libel being true, and as to the report being fair and accurate and published without malice, and as to any matter which under this or any other Act or otherwise might be given

in evidence by way of defence by the person charged on his trial on indictment; and the Court, if of opinion after hearing such evidence that there is a strong or probable presumption that the jury at the trial would acquit the person charged, may dismiss the case.

Obscene matter

15. It shall not be necessary to set out in any indictment or other judicial proceeding instituted against the publisher of any obscene libel the obscene passage, but it shall be sufficient to deposit the book, newspaper, or other documents containing the alleged libel with the indictment or other judicial proceeding, together with particulars showing precisely by reference to pages, columns, and lines, in what part of the book, newspaper, or other document the alleged libel is to be found, and such particulars shall be deemed to form part of the record, and all proceedings may be taken thereon as though the passages complained of had been set out in the indictment or judicial proceeding.

Proof of publication of newspaper, book or periodical

16. Upon the trial of an action or prosecution in respect of a libel contained in a newspaper or book, the production of such newspaper or book containing a printed statement that it is printed or published by or for the defendant shall be *prima facie* evidence of the publication of the said newspaper or book by the defendant.

Proof of copies of newspaper

17. Upon the trial of an action or prosecution in respect of a libel contained in a newspaper, after evidence sufficient in the opinion of the court has been given of the publication by the defendant of the newspaper containing the libel, other prints purporting to be other numbers or parts of the same newspaper formerly or subsequently published, and containing a printed statement that they were published by or for the defendant, shall be admissible in evidence on either side without further proof of publication of them.

PART IA
LIABILITY FOR ANIMALS

Liability for animals

17a. (1) Subject to this section, liability for injury, damage or loss caused by an animal shall be determined in accordance with the principles of the law of negligence.

(2) In determining the standard of care to be exercised in relation to the keeping, management and control of an animal, a court shall take into account—

(a) the nature and disposition of the animal (which shall be determined according to the facts of the particular case and not according to any legal categorization);

and

(b) any other relevant matters.

(3) It is not necessary for a person seeking damages for injury, damage or loss caused by an animal to establish prior knowledge on the part of any other person of a vicious, dangerous or mischievous propensity of the animal.

(4) In any proceedings relating to injury, damage or loss caused by an animal, it shall not be a circumstance of excuse, mitigation or justification that the injury, damage or loss was caused by reason of the animal straying onto a public street or road.

(5) In an action arising from injury, damage or loss caused by an animal to an employee, it shall not be presumed that the employee voluntarily assumed risks attendant upon his employment that may have arisen from working in proximity to animals.

(6) A court in determining whether a reasonable standard of care was exercised in a particular case shall take into account measures taken—

(a) for the custody and control of the animal;

and

(b) to warn against any vicious, dangerous or mischievous propensity that it might exhibit.

(7) Notwithstanding subsection (6), the fact that in a particular case no measures were taken for the custody and control of an animal, or to warn against any vicious, dangerous or mischievous propensity that it might exhibit, does not necessarily show that a reasonable standard of care was not exercised.

(8) Where a person incites, or knowingly permits, an animal to cause injury, damage or loss to another, he shall be liable in trespass for that injury, damage or loss.

(9) Subject to subsection (10), this section operates to the exclusion of any other principles upon which liability for injury, damage or loss caused by an animal would, but for this subsection, be determined in tort.

(10) This section—

(a) does not affect an action in nuisance where an animal is the cause of, or involved in, the nuisance;

(b) does not derogate from any other statutory right or remedy;

and

(c) does not affect any cause of action that arose before the commencement of the *Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1983*.

PART IB
OCCUPIERS LIABILITY

Interpretation

17b. In this Part, unless the contrary intention appears—

“dangerous” includes unsafe:

“landlord” includes a landlord under a statutory tenancy:

“occupier” of premises means a person in occupation or control of the premises, and includes a landlord:

“premises” means—

(a) land;

(b) a building or structure (including a moveable building or structure);

or

(c) a vehicle (including an aircraft or a ship, boat or vessel).

Occupier’s duty of care

17c. (1) Subject to this Part, the liability of the occupier of premises for injury, damage or loss attributable to the dangerous state or condition of the premises shall be determined in accordance with the principles of the law of negligence.

(2) In determining the standard of care to be exercised by the occupier of premises, a court shall take into account—

(a) the nature and extent of the premises;

(b) the nature and extent of the danger arising from the state or condition of the premises;

(c) the circumstances in which the person alleged to have suffered injury, damage or loss, or the property of that person, became exposed to that danger;

(d) the age of the person alleged to have suffered injury, damage or loss, and the ability of that person to appreciate the danger;

(e) the extent (if at all) to which the occupier was aware, or ought to have been aware, of—

(i) the danger;

and

(ii) the entry of persons onto the premises;

(f) the measures (if any) taken to eliminate, reduce or warn against the danger;

(g) the extent (if at all) to which it would have been reasonable and practicable for the occupier to take measures to eliminate, reduce or warn against the danger;

and

(h) any other matter that the court thinks relevant.

(3) The fact that an occupier has not taken any measures to eliminate, reduce or warn against a danger arising from the state or condition of premises does not necessarily show that the occupier has failed to exercise a reasonable standard of care.

(4) Subject to any Act or law to the contrary, an occupier's duty of care may be reduced or excluded by contract but no contractual reduction or exclusion of the duty affects the rights of any person who is a stranger to the contract.

(5) Where an occupier is, by contract or by reason of some other Act or law, subject to a higher standard of care than would be applicable apart from this subsection, the question of whether the occupier is liable for injury, damage or loss shall be determined by reference to that higher standard of care.

(6) An occupier owes no duty of care to a trespasser unless—

(a) the presence of trespassers on the premises, and their consequent exposure to danger, were reasonably foreseeable;

and

(b) the nature or extent of the danger was such that measures which were not in fact taken should have been taken for their protection.

Landlord's liability limited to breach of duty to repair

17d. The liability under this Part of a landlord who is not in occupation of premises is limited to injury, damage or loss arising from—

(a) an act or omission on the part of the landlord in carrying out an obligation to maintain or repair the premises;

or

(b) a failure on the part of the landlord to carry out an obligation to maintain or repair the premises.

Exclusion of conflicting common law principles

17e. (1) Subject to subsection (2), this Part operates to the exclusion of any other principles on which liability for injury, damage or loss attributable to the state or condition of premises would, but for this Part, be determined in tort.

(2) This Part does not apply to a case where an occupier causes a dangerous state or condition of premises, or allows premises to fall into a dangerous state or condition, intending to cause injury, damage or loss to another.

PART II

WRONGFUL ACTS OR NEGLIGENCE CAUSING DEATH

* * * * *

Liability for death caused wrongfully

19. Whenever the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death was caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.

Effect and mode of bringing action, awarding of damages for funeral expenses, etc.

20. (1) Every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, brother, sister and child of the person whose death has been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor or administrator of the person deceased.

(2) In every such action the court may give such damages as it thinks proportioned to the injury resulting from such death to the parties respectively for whom and for whose benefit the action is brought.

(2a) In any such action in respect of the death of any person after the passing of the *Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1939*, damages may be awarded in respect of any medical expenses incurred as a result of the injury causing the death and the funeral expenses of the deceased person if such expenses have been incurred by the parties for whose benefit the action is brought.

(2aa) In assessing damages under this section in any action based on a death occurring after the passing of the *Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1956*, there shall not be taken into account—

- (i) any sum paid or payable on the death of the deceased under any contract of assurance or insurance, whether made before or after the passing of the said Act:
- (ii) any sum paid or payable consequent on the death of the deceased person as a gratuity to any person for whose benefit the action is brought:
- (iii) any superannuation payments or benefits consequent upon the death of the deceased person:
- (iv) any sum paid or payable consequent upon the death of the deceased person under any contributory medical hospital death or funeral benefit scheme:
- (v) any sum paid or payable as a social service benefit or pension by the Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia, or the United Kingdom, or the State of South Australia to or in respect of any person for whose benefit the action is brought.

* * * * *

(3) The amount so recovered, after deducting the costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided amongst the before-mentioned parties in such shares as the court finds and directs.

(4) Where a deceased person is survived by a legal spouse and a putative spouse, the action shall, subject to this section, be brought for the benefit of both.

(5) An action need not be brought under this section for the benefit of a person who has, by notice in writing served upon the executor or administrator of the deceased, renounced the benefit of this section.

(6) Where the court considers it appropriate that any person for whose benefit an action lies under this section should present an independent claim for the benefit of an action under this section, it may permit or require that person to appear or be represented in the proceedings in all respects as if he were a separate party to the proceedings.

(7) No action lies against the executor or administrator for failing to bring an action for the benefit of a putative spouse if he brings the action without notice of the claim of the putative spouse under this section, but the interest of any such spouse in the action shall be recognized by the court if application for recognition is made to the court before the proceedings are finally determined.

Restriction of actions and time of commencement

21. Not more than one action shall lie under this Part for and in respect of the same subject matter of complaint; and every such action shall be commenced within three years after the death of the deceased person.

Particulars of the person for whom damages claimed

22. In every such action the plaintiff shall be required to deliver to the defendant or his solicitor, full particulars of the person or persons for whom and on whose behalf the action is brought, and of the nature of the claim in respect of which damages are sought to be recovered.

Provision where no executor or administrator or action not commenced within six months

23. (1) In any case falling under section 19 of this Act, if there is no executor or administrator of the deceased person or, there being such an executor or administrator, no action is commenced under this Part within six months after the death of the deceased person, then an action may be brought by and in the name or names of the person or all or any of the persons for whose benefit an action could have been brought under this Part by an executor or administrator of the deceased person.

(2) Every action brought under this section shall be for the benefit of the same persons and shall be subject to the same regulations and procedure as nearly as may be as if brought by or in the name of an executor or administrator of the deceased person.

Liability to parents of person wrongfully killed

23a. (1) Whenever the death of an infant is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the infant to maintain an action to recover damages, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to pay to the surviving parents or parent of the child such sum—

(a) where the death occurred before the commencement of the *Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1974*—not exceeding one thousand dollars;

or

(b) where the death occurred after the commencement of the *Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1974*—not exceeding three thousand dollars,

as the court thinks just by way of *solatium* for the suffering caused to the parents or parent by the death of the child.

(2) Where both parents bring an action to recover any sum of money payable under this section, the amount recovered after deducting the costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided between the parents in such shares as the court directs.

(3) Where both parents survive the child and either of them does not join in bringing an action under this section, the other may bring an action for such amount as he claims to be due to him or her.

(4) In this section "parent" means the father or mother of a child.

Liability to surviving spouse of person wrongfully killed

23b. (1) Whenever the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled that person to maintain an action to recover damages, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to pay to the surviving spouse of the deceased person such sum—

(a) where the death occurred before the commencement of the *Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1974*—not exceeding one thousand four hundred dollars;

or

(b) where the death occurred after the commencement of the *Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1974*—not exceeding four thousand two hundred dollars,

as the court thinks just by way of *solatium* for the suffering caused to the spouse by that death.

(2) Where the deceased person is survived by a lawful spouse and a putative spouse, they may both claim *solatium* under this section, but the total amount awarded by way of *solatium* in any such case shall not exceed the amount that could have been awarded if the deceased had been survived by a single spouse.

(3) Where, in any proceedings under this section, a lawful spouse and a putative spouse both claim *solatium* under this section, any *solatium* awarded by the court shall be apportioned between the claimants in such manner as the court thinks just.

(4) In any proceeding by a lawful spouse for *solatium* it is not necessary for the court to inquire if the deceased was also survived by a putative spouse, but any such spouse may, at any time before the proceedings are finally determined, apply to the court to be joined as a party to the proceedings.

Further provisions as to *solatium*, etc.

23c. (1) The rights conferred by sections 23a and 23b shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any rights conferred on the parent, husband or wife by any other provision of this Act.

(2) In an action brought to enforce any right given under section 23a or 23b of this Act the court may in its discretion refuse to order the payment of any sum by way of *solatium* if, having regard to the conduct of the plaintiff in relation to the deceased person, or to the relations which existed between the plaintiff and the deceased person, or for any other sufficient reason, it considers that no such payment should be made.

(3) Any cause of action conferred on any person by section 23a or 23b of this Act shall not, on the death of that person, survive for the benefit of his estate.

(4) A cause of action conferred on a person by section 23a or section 23b of this Act is exercisable notwithstanding that the death of the person injured by the wrongful act, neglect or default was caused in circumstances which in law amount to a felony.

PART III

GENERAL PROVISIONS

*Proceedings against and Contributions between Tort-Feasors***Interpretation****24.** In section 25 to 27 inclusive—

“parent” and “child” have the same meaning as they have in and for the purposes of Part II of this Act:

the reference to “the judgment first given” shall in a case where that judgment is reversed on appeal, be construed as a reference to the judgment first given which is not so reversed, and in a case where a judgment is varied on appeal, be construed as a reference to that judgment as so varied.

Proceedings against and contribution between joint and several tort-feasors**25.** (1) Where damage is suffered by any person as a result of a tort (whether a crime or not)—

(a) judgment recovered against any tort-feasor liable in respect of that damage shall not be a bar to an action against any other person who would, if sued, have been liable as a joint tort-feasor in respect of the same damage:

(b) if more than one action is brought in respect of that damage by or on behalf of the person by whom it was suffered, or for the benefit of the estate, or of the wife, husband, parent or child of that person against tort-feasors liable in respect of the damage (whether as joint tort-feasors or otherwise) the sums recoverable under the judgments given in those actions by way of damages shall not in the aggregate exceed the amount of the damages awarded by the judgment first given; and in any of those actions, other than that in which judgment is first given, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to costs unless the court is of opinion that there was reasonable ground for bringing the action:

(c) any tort-feasor liable in respect of that damage may recover contribution from any other tort-feasor who is, or would at any time have been, liable in respect of the same damage, whether as a joint tort-feasor or otherwise, so, however, that no person shall be entitled to recover contribution under this section from any person entitled to be indemnified by him in respect of the liability in respect of which the contribution is sought:

(ca) a tort-feasor who, on or after the coming into operation of the *Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1959*, becomes liable in respect of that damage may recover contribution from a third party as defined in subsection (2) of this section or commence proceedings for such recovery notwithstanding—

(i) that judgment in an action founded on the tort has not been given determining the tort-feasor’s liability in respect of that damage; or

(ii) that the plaintiff as defined in that subsection has released the third party from his liability to the plaintiff for that or any part of that damage; or

(iii) that the plaintiff has not duly given any notice that would be required if the plaintiff were to recover judgment against that person; or

(iv) that the time within which the plaintiff may commence action against the third party has expired; or

(v) that the third party is the Crown or an instrumentality of the Crown:

(d) where the tort or torts causing the damage was or were committed by the husband or wife of the person suffering the damage and some other person, that other person may recover contribution as mentioned in paragraph (c) of this subsection from the husband or wife, as if the husband or wife had been liable to the person suffering the damage.

(2) In this section, so far as the context admits or requires,

“third party” means—

- (i) a tort-feasor from whom any other tort-feasor is entitled to recover contribution under paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section; and
- (ii) the husband or wife of a person suffering the damage and from whom some other person is entitled to recover contribution under paragraph (d) of subsection (1) of this section:

“plaintiff” means the person suffering the damage referred to in subsection (1) of this section whether or not that person has commenced an action for recovery of judgment in respect of the damage:

“proceedings” means proceedings before a court.

(3) Any proceedings by a tort-feasor for the recovery of contribution from a third-party under this section must be instituted before the expiration of two years from the day on which the amount of damages or other compensation payable by the tort-feasor to the plaintiff is determined by the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, or by agreement between the plaintiff and the tort-feasor.

Extent of contribution

26. In any proceedings for contribution under the last preceding section the amount of the contribution recoverable from any person shall be such as may be found by the court to be just and equitable, having regard to the extent of that person's responsibility for the damage; and the court shall have power to exempt any person from liability to make contribution, or to direct that the contribution to be recovered from any person shall amount to a complete indemnity.

Application of this part to proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act

26a. Where proceedings lie against an insurer or nominal defendant under Part IV of the *Motor Vehicles Act, 1959*, as amended, this Part applies to the insurer or nominal defendant as if he were the tort-feasor for whose wrongful act he is liable.

Exemptions

27. Nothing in section 24, 25 or 26 shall—

- (a) apply with respect to any tort committed before the passing of the *Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1939*; or
- (b) affect any criminal proceedings against any person in respect of any wrongful act; or
- (c) render enforceable any agreement for indemnity which would not have been enforceable if this section had not been passed.

*Apportionment of liability in cases of contributory negligence***Apportionment of liability in cases of contributory negligence**

27a. (1) In this section—

“court” means, in relation to any claim, the court or arbitrator by or before whom the claim falls to be determined:

“damage” includes loss of life, personal injury, and suffering for which a sum by way of *solatium* may be awarded under section 23a or 23b of this Act:

“damages” includes any such *solatium* as mentioned in section 23a or 23b of this Act but does not include any sum payable as compensation pursuant to the *Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1932-1950*, or pursuant to any corresponding subsequent enactment:

“dependant” means any person for whose benefit an action could be brought under Part II of this Act:

“fault” means negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omission which gives rise to a liability in tort or would, apart from this Act, give rise to the defence of contributory negligence.

(2) Every reference in this section to the fault of a person shall be deemed to include a reference to a fault for which that person is vicariously responsible and in a case where the claim arises out of the death of a person, a fault of the deceased shall be deemed to be a fault of the claimant.

(3) Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage: Provided that—

(a) this subsection shall not operate to defeat any defence arising under a contract;

(b) this subsection is subject to subsection (4) of this section.

(4) Where damages (not being a *solatium*) are recoverable by virtue of subsection (3), subject to such reduction as is therein mentioned, and a contract or enactment providing for a limitation of liability is applicable to the claim or the jurisdiction of the court is limited, the amount of the damages recoverable shall be arrived at as follows:—

(a) the court shall find the total damages which would have been recoverable if the claimant had not been at fault and there had been no limitation of liability or of the jurisdiction of the court;

(b) the total damages so found shall be reduced to such an extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in responsibility for the damage and the reduced amount shall, except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subsection, be the amount recoverable;

(c) if the amount of damages as reduced under paragraph (b) of this subsection exceeds the limit provided for in the contract or enactment or the limit of the jurisdiction of the court the court shall award the maximum amount of damages permitted by the contract, enactment, or limit of the court’s jurisdiction.

* * * * *

(6) Where damages are recoverable by any person by virtue of subsection (3) subject to such reduction as is therein mentioned, the court shall in every case find and record the total damages which apart from any limitation of liability provided by contract or enactment, or any limitation of the jurisdiction of the court would have been recoverable if the claimant had not been at fault.

(7) Sections 24 to 27 (inclusive) of this Act (which relate to proceedings against, and contributions between, joint and several tort-feasors) shall apply in any case where two or more persons are liable or would, if they had all been sued, be liable by virtue of subsection (3) of this section in respect of the damage suffered by any person.

(8) Where any person dies as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, and accordingly if an action were brought for the benefit of the estate under the *Survival of Causes of Action Act, 1940*, the damages recoverable would be reduced under subsection (3) of this section, any damages recoverable in an action brought for the benefit of the dependants of that person under Part II of this Act and any amount recoverable by way of *solatium* under that Part shall be reduced to a proportionate extent.

(9) Where—

(a) a person (in this subsection called “the injured person”) suffers damage as a result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons; and

(b) by reason of the damage to the injured person a third person suffers damage (whether by way of the loss of the society or services of the injured person or otherwise),

then, in any claim by the third party for the damage so suffered by him the fault of the injured person shall be taken into account under subsection (3) of this section for the purpose of reducing the damages recoverable by the third party as if the said fault were the fault of the third party.

(10) Where, in any case to which subsection (3) of this section applies, one of the persons at fault avoids liability to any other such person or his personal representative by pleading any enactment limiting the time within which proceedings may be taken, he shall not be entitled to recover any damages or contribution from that other person or representative by virtue of the said subsection.

(11) Where any case to which subsection (3) of this section applies is tried with a jury, the jury shall determine the total damages which apart from any limitation of liability provided by contract or enactment or any limitation of the jurisdiction of the court, would have been recoverable if the claimant had not been at fault and the extent to which those damages are to be reduced.

Savings

27b. (1) Section 27a of this Act shall not apply to any claim to which section 111 of the *Supreme Court Act, 1935-1947*, applies and that section shall have effect as if section 27a of this Act had not been passed.

(2) Section 27a of this Act shall not apply to any case where the acts or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred before the passing of the *Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1951*.

Rights as between employer and employee in cases of vicarious liability

Rights as between employer and employee

27c. (1) Notwithstanding any Act or law, or the provisions express or implied of any contract or agreement, where an employee commits a tort for which his employer is vicariously liable—

(a) the employee shall not be liable to indemnify the employer in respect of the vicarious liability incurred by the employer;

and

(b) unless the employee is otherwise entitled to indemnity in respect of his liability, the employer shall be liable to indemnify the employee in respect of liability incurred by the employee in respect of the tort.

(2) Where an employer is proceeded against for the tort of his employee, and the employee is entitled pursuant to a policy of insurance or contract of indemnity to be indemnified in respect of liability that he may incur in respect of the tort, the employer shall be subrogated to the rights of the employee under that policy or contract in respect of the liability incurred by him (the employer), arising from the commission of the tort.

(3) Where a person commits serious and wilful misconduct in the course of his employment and that misconduct constitutes a tort, the provisions of this section shall not apply in respect of that tort.

Mental or Nervous Shock

Personal injury caused by mental or nervous shock

28. (1) In any action for injury to the person caused after the passing of the *Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1939*, the plaintiff shall not be debarred from recovering damages merely because the injury complained of arose wholly or in part from mental or nervous shock.

(2) In determining any question of liability for injury to the person caused before the passing of the *Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1939*, no regard shall be paid to the fact that this section has been enacted, or to the provisions hereof.

Remedies against Certain Shipowners

Remedy against shipowners and others for injuries

29. (1) If it is alleged that the owners of any ship are liable to pay damages in respect of personal injuries, including fatal injuries, caused by the ship or sustained on, in, or about the ship, in any port or harbour in the State, in consequence of the wrongful act, neglect, or default of the owners of the ship, or the master or officers or crew thereof, or any other person in the employment of the owners of the ship, or of any defect in the ship or its apparel or equipment, and at any time that ship is found in any port or river in the State or in any water within three miles of the coast of the State, the Supreme Court or the local court of full jurisdiction nearest to the ship may, upon its being shown to the court by any person applying in accordance with rules of court that the owners are probably liable to pay damages in respect of such injuries and that none of the owners resides in the State, issue an order directed to any officer of the Supreme Court or of the said local court, or of the Minister of Marine, or of any authority exercising the powers vested in the said Minister named in the order, requiring such officer to detain the ship until such time as the owners, agent, master, or consignee thereof have paid such compensation, or have given security, to be approved by a Judge of the Supreme Court, or as the case may be, by a

judge or magistrate of the said local court, to abide the event of any proceedings that may be instituted in respect of the injuries, and to pay all costs and damages that may be awarded thereon.

(2) The officer to whom the order is directed may detain the ship in accordance with the order.

(3) In any legal proceedings in relation to such injuries as aforesaid, the person giving security may be made the defendant, and shall be stated to be the owner of the ship which has caused the injuries, and the production of the order of the judge or magistrate made in relation to the security shall in the said proceedings be conclusive evidence that the defendant is the owner of the ship.

(4) If the owner of a ship is a corporation, such corporation shall, for the purpose of this section, be deemed to reside in the State if it has an office in the State at which service of process can be effected.

(5) If a ship after detention in pursuance of this section or after service on the master of any notice of an order for detention under this section, proceeds to sea before the ship is released by the officer detaining it, the master of the ship, and also the owner, and any person who sends the ship to sea, if that owner or person is party or privy to the offence, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a penalty not exceeding four hundred dollars.

(6) If the master proceeds to sea with the ship in contravention of subsection (5) of this section, and takes to sea any person authorized to detain the ship or any person assisting any person so authorized, the owner and master of the ship shall each be liable to pay all expenses of and incidental to the taking to sea of any such person, in addition to any penalty imposed under subsection (5).

(7) The words "person applying" in this section shall include an employer who has paid compensation, or against whom a claim for compensation has been made, under the *Workmen's Compensation Act, 1932*, or under any corresponding subsequent enactment, if he shows the court that he probably is or will become entitled to be indemnified under that Act or enactment, and in such case this section shall apply as if the employer were a person claiming damages in respect of personal injuries.

(8) The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under this section may be exercised by a single judge of that court sitting in chambers.

Abolition of the rule of common employment

Abolition of rule of common employment

30. (1) Where any injury or damage is suffered by a servant by reason of the wrongful act, neglect or default of a fellow servant, the employer of those servants shall be liable in damages in respect of that injury or damage in the same manner and in the same cases as if those servants had not been engaged in a common employment.

(2) This section applies to any injury or damage arising from a wrongful act, neglect or default committed after the enactment of this section, whether the contract of employment was made before or is made after the enactment of this section.

(3) "Employer" in this section includes the Crown and instrumentalities of the Crown.

* * * * *

Actions in tort relating to husband and wife

Abolition of rule as to unity of spouses

32. (1) Subject to this section, where any injury or damage is suffered by any person by reason of the wrongful act, neglect or default of his spouse, the spouse shall be liable in respect of that injury or damage in all respects as if the injured person and the person by reason of whose wrongful act neglect or default the injury or damage is suffered were not married.

(2) This section shall not be construed as entitling any person to maintain an action in trespass or ejection against his spouse in respect of a matrimonial home.

(3) Where proceedings are brought pursuant to this section, the court may dismiss the proceedings if it appears to the court—

(a) that no substantial benefit would accrue to either party from the continuation of the proceedings;

or

(b) that the question or questions in issue could be more conveniently disposed of on an application under section 105 of the *Law of Property Act*.

Wife may claim for loss or impairment of consortium

33. (1) Where a person causes injury to another by wrongful act, neglect or default, he shall (whether or not the injury results in death) be liable in damages to the wife of the injured person for loss or injury suffered by her as a result of the loss or impairment of the consortium of husband and wife.

(2) The damages shall be assessed in the same manner as upon a claim by a husband for damages in tort in respect of loss or impairment of consortium.

Damages where injured spouse participated in a business

34. (1) Where a husband and wife are engaged in the conduct of a business, and either of them suffers an injury as a result of which his or her participation in the conduct of the business ceases or is impaired, the other spouse shall be entitled to recover from a person whose wrongful act, neglect or default caused the injury compensation for loss that he or she has suffered or continues to suffer by reason of the fact that the participation of his or her spouse in the conduct of the business has ceased or has been impaired.

(2) In this section—

“business” includes any professional or commercial undertaking;

“injury” includes an injury that results in the death of a spouse.

Abolition of actions of seduction, enticement and harbouring

Abolition of actions for enticement, seduction and harbouring

35. The following actions at common law are abolished—

(a) the action for seduction;

(b) the action for enticement;

and

(c) the action for harbouring.

Principles governing assessment of damages in relation to injuries arising from motor accidents

Motor accidents

35a. (1) Notwithstanding any other law, where damages are to be assessed for or in respect of an injury arising from a motor accident, the following provisions apply:

- (a) no damages shall be awarded for non-economic loss unless—
- (i) the injured person's ability to lead a normal life was significantly impaired by the injury for a period of at least seven days;
 - or
 - (ii) the injured person has reasonably incurred medical expenses of at least the prescribed minimum in connection with the injury;
- (b) if damages are to be awarded for non-economic loss, they shall be assessed as follows:
- (i) the injured person's total non-economic loss shall be assigned a numerical value on a scale running from 0 to 60 (the greater the severity of the non-economic loss, the higher the number);
- and
- (ii) the damages to be awarded for non-economic loss shall then be calculated by multiplying the prescribed amount by the number assigned under subparagraph (i);
- (c) no damages shall be awarded for mental or nervous shock except in favour of—
- (i) a person who was physically injured in the accident, who was the driver of or a passenger in or on a motor vehicle involved in the accident or who was, when the accident occurred, present at the scene of the accident;
 - or
 - (ii) a parent, spouse or child of a person killed, injured or endangered in the accident;
- (d) if the injured person was incapacitated for work, no damages shall be awarded for loss of earning capacity in respect of the first week of the incapacity;
- (e) if—
- (i) the injured person is to be compensated by way of a lump sum for loss of future earning capacity or other future losses;
- and
- (ii) an actuarial multiplier is used for the purpose of calculating the present value of the future losses,
- then in determining the actuarial multiplier a prescribed discount rate shall be applied;
- (f) no damages shall be awarded to compensate for the cost of the investment or management of the amount awarded;

(g) no damages shall be awarded—

(i) to allow for the recompense of gratuitous services except services of a parent, spouse or child of the injured person;

or

(ii) to allow for the reimbursement of expenses, other than reasonable out-of-pocket expenses, voluntarily incurred, or to be voluntarily incurred, by a person rendering gratuitous services to the injured person;

(h) damages awarded to allow for the recompense of gratuitous services of a parent, spouse or child shall not exceed four times State average weekly earnings;

(i) if the injured person (not being a minor) was, contrary to the requirements of the *Road Traffic Act, 1961*, not wearing a seat belt at the time of the accident, the damages to be awarded shall, on account of that contravention, be reduced by 15 per cent or such greater percentage as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the extent to which the proper use of a seat belt would have reduced or lessened the severity of the injury;

(j) if—

(i) the injured person (not being a minor) was, at the time of the accident, a voluntary passenger in or on a motor vehicle;

and

(ii) the driver's ability to drive the motor vehicle was impaired in consequence of the consumption of alcohol or a drug and the injured person was aware, or ought to have been aware of the impairment,

it shall be presumed that the injured person was negligent in failing to take sufficient care for his or her own safety, and the damages shall be reduced to such extent as may be just and equitable having regard to that negligence;

(k) no interest shall be awarded on damages compensating a non-economic or prospective loss;

and

(l) any interest awarded must not be calculated from a date antecedent to the date of commencement of the proceedings.

(2) Notwithstanding the limits fixed by subsection (1)(h), if the court is satisfied that by rendering gratuitous services a parent, spouse or child has saved or will save the injured person the cost of engaging another person to provide those services (those services being reasonably required by the injured person), the court may make an award of damages in excess of that limit but the damages awarded in that event must not reflect a rate of remuneration for the person providing the services in excess of State average weekly earnings.

(3) A person shall not be regarded as a voluntary passenger in or on a motor vehicle for the purposes of subsection (1)(j) if, in the circumstances of the case, that person could not reasonably be expected to have declined to become a passenger in or on the vehicle.

(4) Where a presumption of negligence arises under subsection (1)(j), the defence of *volenti non fit injuria* is not available against the injured person.

(5) For the purposes of this section, an injury shall not be regarded as arising from a motor accident if it is not a consequence of—

- (a) the driving of a motor vehicle;
 - (b) a collision, or action taken to avoid a collision, with a stationary vehicle;
- or
- (c) a motor vehicle running out of control.

(6) In this section—

“the Consumer Price Index” means the Consumer Price Index (all groups index for Adelaide) published by the Commonwealth Statistician under the *Census and Statistics Act 1905* of the Commonwealth:

“court” includes an authority with judicial or quasi-judicial powers:

“injury” means bodily injury and includes—

- (a) mental and nervous shock;
- and
- (b) death;

and “injured” has a corresponding meaning:

“medical expenses” includes—

- (a) the fees of medical practitioners and other professional medical advisers and therapists;
- (b) the cost of hospitalization;
- (c) the cost of medicines and therapeutic appliances:

“motor accident” means an incident in which injury is caused by or arises out of the use of a motor vehicle:

“motor vehicle” means a motor vehicle as defined in the *Motor Vehicles Act 1959*, and includes a vehicle that—

- (a) runs on a railway, tramway or other fixed track or path;
- and
- (b) is operated by—
 - (i) the State Transport Authority;or
 - (ii) the Australian National Railways Commission:

“non-economic loss” means—

- (a) pain and suffering;
- (b) loss of amenities of life;
- (c) loss of expectation of life;
- (d) disfigurement:

“the prescribed amount” means—

- (a) in relation to an injury arising from a motor accident that occurred during 1987—\$1 000;
- (b) in relation to an injury arising from a motor accident that occurred in a subsequent calendar year—a sum (calculated to the nearest multiple of \$10) that bears to \$1 000 the same proportion as the Consumer Price Index for the September quarter of the preceding year bears to the Consumer Price Index for the September quarter, 1986:

“the prescribed discount rate” means—

(a) if no percentage is fixed by regulation for the purposes of this definition—5 per cent;

(b) if such a percentage is fixed by regulation—the percentage so fixed:

“the prescribed minimum” means—

(a) if no amount is fixed by regulation for the purposes of this definition—\$1 000;

(b) if such an amount is fixed by regulation—the amount so fixed:

“State average weekly earnings”, means the amount published by the Commonwealth Statistician as an estimate of Average Weekly Earnings for Ordinary Hours of Work for each Full-time Employed Male Unit in the State.

(7) This section is intended to apply to the assessment of damages in respect of an injury arising from a motor accident that occurred in this State—

(a) irrespective of whether the assessment is made by a court of the State or by a court of some other state, territory or country;

and

(b) notwithstanding that the court by which the assessment is made would not (but for this subsection) assess the damages in accordance with, or by reference to, South Australian law.

(8) If—

(a) damages in respect of an injury arising from a motor accident that occurred in this State are assessed by a court that is not a court of the State;

(b) notwithstanding subsection (7), the court does not assess damages in accordance with this section and the amount of the damages awarded exceeds the amount that would have been awarded in an action before a court of the State;

and

(c) the State Government Insurance Commission or the Crown is liable to pay the damages awarded either under a policy of insurance or on the basis of vicarious liability,

the State Government Insurance Commission or the Crown is entitled to recover from the person to whom the damages were awarded any amount in excess of the damages that would have been awarded by a court of the State had the damages been assessed by such a court in accordance with this section.

(9) In the course of proceedings under subsection (8) a court may—

(a) receive in evidence any transcript of evidence in proceedings before the court by which the damages were awarded and draw any conclusions of fact from the evidence that it considers proper;

or

(b) adopt any of that court’s findings of fact.

LIABILITY FOR PERJURY IN CIVIL ACTIONS

Liability for perjury in civil actions

36. (1) Subject to this section, a person who gives perjured evidence in civil proceedings is liable for damage suffered by any other person in consequence of the perjury.

(2) In proceedings under this section, the plaintiff must establish—

(a) that the defendant—

(i) has been convicted of perjury;

(ii) has been found guilty of contempt of court on the ground of having committed perjury;

or

(iii) has been committed for trial on a charge of perjury but by reason of the fact that no indictment has been preferred, or a *nolle prosequi* has been entered, has not been tried on that charge;

and

(b) that the perjured evidence was material to the outcome of the proceedings in which it was given.

(3) Where the defendant has not been convicted of perjury, or been found guilty of contempt of court on the ground of having committed perjury, the evidence upon which a liability is alleged to arise under this section must be corroborated in a material particular.

(4) It is no defence to an action under this section that the perjured evidence was accepted as true by the court before which it was given.

(5) In proceedings under this section, an apparently genuine document that appears to be a transcript of evidence given in the proceedings in which the perjured evidence is alleged to have been given shall be accepted as evidence—

(a) of the evidence given in those proceedings;

and

(b) where evidence appears from the transcript to have been given by a particular person—that it was in fact given by that person.

APPENDIX

Legislative History

Transitional provision from Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1986, s. 4

4. The amendments made by this Act do not affect a cause of action that arose before the commencement of this Act.

Transitional provision from Wrongs Act Amendment Act, 1987, s. 4

4. This Act does not affect a cause of action that arose before its commencement and does not give rise to a cause of action in relation to an event that occurred before its commencement.

Legislative history prior to 3 February 1976 appears in marginal notes and footnotes included in the consolidation of this Act contained in Volume 11 of The Public General Acts of South Australia 1837-1975 at page 642.

Section 3: substituted by 116, 1983, s. 2
 Section 3b: inserted by 116, 1983, s. 3
 Section 6: amended by 116, 1983, s. 4
 Section 7(1): amended by 116, 1983, s. 5
 Section 8: amended by 116, 1983, s. 6
 Section 10(1): amended by 116, 1983, s. 7
 Section 11: amended by 116, 1983, s. 8
 Section 14: amended by 116, 1983, s. 9

Part 1A comprising s. 17a and heading inserted by 116, 1983, s. 10

Part 1B comprising ss. 17b - 17e and heading inserted by 45, 1987, s. 3

Section 31 and heading: repealed by 116, 1983, s. 11
 Section 35a and heading: inserted by 126, 1986, s. 3
 Section 35a(5): amended by 41, 1988, s. 3
 Section 35a(6): definition of "motor vehicle" inserted by 30, 1991, s. 2
 Section 36 and heading: inserted by 87, 1983, s. 2